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Copyright and Underwater Cultural
Heritage*
Tyler T. Ochoa**

I
INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection
of Underwater Cultural Heritage is to encourage preservation of
underwater cultural heritage in situ, in its original location on the
ocean floor.1 There is an obvious conflict between this goal and
the traditional admiralty-law principles of the law of salvage and
the law of finds,2 both of which have the effect of encouraging the
removal and disposition of valuable cultural artifacts from the
ocean floor.3 Indeed, expeditions to locate historical shipwrecks
--------------------

*Copyright © 2018 by Tyler T. Ochoa. Permission to reproduce this article with
attribution to the author and with citation to this volume is granted according to the
Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode (last visited Aug. 15,
2017).
**Professor, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B.
1983, J.D. 1987, Stanford University. The author would like to thank Prano Amjadi of
the Santa Clara University Law Library for her assistance in locating some of the more
obscure sources. The author also would like to thank Kristen van de Biezenbos of the
University of Calgary Faculty of Law, for the invitation to speak on this topic at the 2018
AALS Conference and the other panelists for their informative presentations at the
Conference.
1
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov.
2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40, Art. 2(5) & Annex, Rule 1 (2002). “Underwater cultural heritage”
is defined as “all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological
character which have been partially or totally under water, periodically or continuously,
for at least 100 years,” including “sites, structures, buildings, artifacts and human
remains,” and “vessels, aircraft, other vehicles . . . [and] their cargo or other contents, . . .
together with their archaeological and natural context[s].” Id. Art. 1(1).
2
See Part II.A., infra.
3
Under the law of finds, “[p]ersons who actually reduce lost or abandoned objects
to possession and persons who are actively and ably engaged in efforts to do so are
legally protected against interference from others, whereas persons who simply discover
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were traditionally financed by the prospect of being able to share
in any treasure that might be recovered.4 Since removal and
disposition of artifacts is now expressly discouraged, parties are
increasingly financing underwater exploration by selling the rights
to broadcast underwater photography of the expedition.5 In other
words, copyright law is rapidly becoming a more important part of
the means of financing archeological exploration of the world’s
underwater cultural heritage.
This article will focus on three aspects of copyright law as it
applies to the photography of underwater cultural heritage. First, to
what extent can a salvor claim exclusive rights to photograph a
particular site?6 Second, who is the author (or who are the authors)
--------------------

or locate such property, but do not undertake to reduce it to possession, are not.” Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560,
572–73 (5th Cir. 1981). Similarly, “the law of salvage, like the law of finds, requires a
salvor to establish possession over property before obtaining the right to exclude others.”
Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 460 (4th
Cir. 1992). To maintain exclusive salvage rights, salvage operations must be diligent,
ongoing, and clothed with some prospect of success; so where a company fails to salvage
property for a lengthy period of time, it can lose its rights to another who is willing and
able to salvage the property. Martha’s Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1061 (1st Cir.
1987).
4
See, e.g., GARY KINDER, SHIP OF GOLD IN THE DEEP BLUE SEA, 188–89, 226–28,
281–82 (Vintage Books 1999) (expedition to discover lost treasure ship Central America
raised $200,000 in seed money, $1.4 million for search, and $3.6 million for verification
and recovery); Eoghan Macguire, Why Scouring Sea for Sunken Treasures is Big
Business, CNN, Mar. 14, 2012, at ¶¶ 7–8 (“The possibility to reap such bountiful rewards
has inevitably led to increased industry investment in recent years . . . . Hedge funds,
private equity firms as well as cash rich individual investors have all been eager to
provide the capital to back increasingly specialized treasure ventures.”), at
https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/13/business/sunken-treasure-business/index.html (last
visited May 1, 2018).
5
See, e.g., RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 1996 AMC 2497,
2499 (E.D. Va. 1996) (listing “video sales, film documentaries, and television broadcasts
as inventive marketing ideas that R.M.S. Titanic must resort to since it is not selling the
artifacts.”). See also Kimberly L. Faulk & Rick Allen, Lights, Camera . . . Shipwreck!?!
Multimedia at Four Thousand Feet, 51 Hist. Archeology 418 (2017) (discussing
advantages of archeologists partnering with videographers to document salvage
expeditions); Meson Capital Partners Investigative Report, Odyssey Marine Exploration
Co (OMEX): Do Investors Know What Lies Beneath the Surface?, at 4 (“we believe
UNESCO’s new regulations to protect national gravesites and heritage make for-profit
historic shipwreck hunting unviable.”), at https://s3.amazonaws.com/omextruth/
omexreport.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018).
6
See Part III.A., infra.
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of such underwater photography, which increasingly involves the
use of remote-controlled robotic drones?7 Third, to what extent can
a State control the use of underwater photography that falls within
its territorial waters?8 All three of these aspects have been the
subject of lawsuits and judicial opinions in the United States; and
those opinions shed light on the utility of copyright to serve the new
role that those who seek to protect underwater cultural heritage
have thrust upon it.
July 2018

II
BACKGROUND
A. Admiralty Law9
There are two maritime-law doctrines that are relevant to
underwater cultural heritage: the law of finds and the law of
salvage. “The law of finds defines the circumstances under which
a party may be said to have acquired title to ownerless property.”10
The law of finds “is applied to previously owned sunken property
only when that property has been abandoned by its previous
owners.”11 In such a case, the law of finds follows “the ancient and
honorable principle of ‘finders, keepers.’”12
The law of salvage, by contrast, “specifies the circumstances
under which a party may be said to have acquired, not title, but the
right to take possession of property (e.g., vessels, equipment, and
cargo) for the purpose of saving it from destruction, damage, or
loss, and to retain it until proper compensation has been paid.”13
“Salvage is a reward given to persons who save or rescue a ship or
a ship's goods from shipwreck, fire, or capture.”14 “Three elements
-------------------7

See Part III.B., infra.
See Part III.C., infra.
9
Part II.A. can be skipped by those already familiar with general principles of
maritime law.
10
Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 460
(4th Cir. 1992).
11
Id. at 461.
12
Id. at 459.
13
Id. at 460.
14
Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 19 F.3d 1136, 1141 (7th
Cir. 1994).
8
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are necessary to a valid salvage claim: (1) marine peril; (2)
voluntary service rendered outside . . . of an existing duty or
contract; and (3) success by the salvor . . . [in] contribut[ing] to
saving the salvaged property.”15 A successful salvage claim gives
the salvor a maritime lien upon the saved property; the amount of
the salvage award requires consideration of several factors,
including “the degree to which the salvors have worked to protect
the historical and archeological value of the wreck and items
salved.”16
The relationship between the law of salvage and the law of finds
has been described as follows:
[W]hen sunken ships or their cargo are rescued from the bottom of
the ocean by those other than the owners, courts favor applying the
law of salvage over the law of finds. Finds law should be applied,
however, in situations where the previous owners are found to have
abandoned their property. . . . Should the property encompass an
ancient and longlost shipwreck, a court may infer an abandonment.
Such an inference would be improper, though, should a previous
owner appear and assert his ownership interest; in such a case . . .
an abandonment would have to be proved by strong and convincing
evidence.17

Congress has modified traditional maritime law for shipwrecks
located within three miles of the coast.18 Under the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act of 1987,19 the United States claimed title to any
abandoned shipwreck within three miles of the coast and

-------------------15

Id.
Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 468
(4th Cir. 1992).
17
Id. at 464–65.
18
See 43 U.S.C. § 2012(f) (“For purposes of this chapter . . . (f) the term ‘submerged
lands’ means the lands—
16

(1) that are ‘lands beneath navigable waters,’ as defined in section 1301 of this
title”); 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (The term “lands beneath navigable waters” means—
(2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not
above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles
distant from the coast line of each such State”).
19

Pub. L. No. 100–298, § 102 Stat. 432 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106).
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simultaneously transferred title to the respective States.20 Congress
expressly preempted traditional maritime law with respect to any
such shipwrecks.21
Congress has also enacted the Sunken Military Craft Act,22
which prohibits “any activity directed at a sunken military craft that
disturbs, removes, or injures any sunken military craft” except
under an authorized permit or regulation.23 The Act expressly
preempts traditional maritime law with respect to “any United
States sunken military craft, wherever located,” and “any foreign
sunken military craft located in United States waters.”24
In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea,25 the United States’ territorial waters extend 12 miles
out from the coast.26 Twelve miles beyond that is the United States’
contiguous zone, within which a nation can enforce its customs,
taxation, immigration, and pollution laws.27 The United States also
claims an exclusive economic zone out to 200 miles from the
coast,28 within which it has “sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources . . . of the seabed and its subsoil.”29 Finally, the United
States also claims jurisdiction over the subsoil and seabed of the
July 2018

-------------------20

43 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1) (“The United States asserts title to any abandoned
shipwreck that is . . . embedded in submerged lands of a State”); id., § 2105(c) (“The
title of the United States to any abandoned shipwreck asserted under subsection (a) . . .
is transferred to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located.”).
The United States retained title to shipwrecks located within the public lands of the
United States. Id., §2105(d).
21
43 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (“The law of salvage and the law of finds shall not apply to
abandoned shipwrecks to which section 2105 of this title applies.”).
22
Pub. L. No. 108–375, Title XIV, §§ 1401–1408, 118 Stat. 2094–2098 (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 113 Note).
23
Id., § 1402(a).
24
Id., § 1406(c) (preempting law of finds); see also id., § 1406(d) (preempting law
of salvage).
25
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (hereinafter UNCLOS). The United States has
not ratified UNCLOS, but it generally follows its precepts.
26
Id., art. 2; Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988),
103 Stat. 2981.
27
UNCLOS, art. 33; Presidential Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Sept.
22, 1999).
28
Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
29
UNCLOS, art. 56(1)(a).
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outer Continental Shelf, but this statute has been interpreted to
extend only to natural resources, so it does not include any
shipwrecks lying beyond the territorial waters of the United
States.31 Finally, in international waters outside the 12-mile
boundary, “[a]ll objects of an archaeological and historical nature
. . . shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as
a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of
the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the
State of historical and archaeological origin.”32 While Congress has
jurisdiction to regulate the activities of United States citizens
anywhere in the world, it has not done so with respect to underwater
cultural heritage.33

B. Copyright Law34
Under the Copyright Act of 1976,35 “[c]opyright protection
subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.”36 “Original . . . means only that the work
was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”37 Works of authorship
include “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,”38 including
photographs;39 and “motion pictures and other audiovisual works.”40
“Fixed” means that a work is recorded in some “permanent or stable”
-------------------30

43 U.S.C. § 1331 (defining “outer Continental Shelf”); id., § 1332(1); id., §
1333(a)(1). See also UNCLOS, art. 77(1).
31
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
569 F.2d 330, 338–40 (5th Cir. 1978). “It is clearly understood that the rights in question
do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion) lying
on the seabed or covered by the sand of the subsoil.” Id. at 340.
32
UNCLOS, art. 149. “The Area” is defined as “the seabed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Id., art. 1(1).
33
Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d at 343 & n.36.
34
Part II.B. can be skipped by those already familiar with general principles of
copyright law.
35
Pub. L. No. 94–553, Title I, § 101, 94 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in Title 17,
§§ 101–805).
36
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
37
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
38
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
39
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).
40
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6).
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form. “A work is created when it is fixed . . . for the first time;
where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that
has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that
time.”42
Thus, when an expedition takes a number of underwater
photographs, each photo has a separate copyright; and when an
expedition records hours of underwater video, all of the footage is
protected by copyright. “In no case,” however, “does copyright
protection . . . extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”43 Thus, the location of a historic
shipwreck is not protected by copyright, even if an expedition was
the first to discover and record that location.44 Moreover, copyright
in a photo generally is limited to the “angle of shot, light and shade,
exposure, effects achieved by means of filters [or] developing
techniques,”45 and timing.46 Others generally are free to take
different photos of the same subject matter, unless the photographer
posed or staged the subject.47
The copyright in an original work of authorship is owned by “the
author or authors of the work.”48 The authors of a “joint work,” or
July 2018
41

-------------------41

17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “fixed”).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “created”) (internal quotes omitted).
43
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
44
Cf. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347
(1991) (“No one may claim originality as to facts . . . because facts do not owe their
origin to an act of authorship. . . . The first person to find and report a particular fact has
not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”).
45
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(quoting HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 4.57
at 229 (3d ed. Butterworths 2000)).
46
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53. Similarly, for video copyright protects
creative choices “concerning camera angles, types of shots, . . . and shot selection.” See
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players’ Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668–69
(7th Cir. 1986).
47
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (“Insofar as a photograph is original in the
rendition or timing, copyright protects the image but does not prevent others from
photographing the same object or scene. . . . By contrast, . . . an artist who arranges and
then photographs a scene often will have the right to prevent others from duplicating that
scene in a photograph or other medium.”).
48
17 U.S.C. § 201(a). “As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression
42
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a work of joint authorship, are co-owners of copyright in the
work.49 “In the case of a work made for hire, [however,] the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author . . ., and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright.”50 The definition of “work
made for hire” includes first, “a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment;”51 and second, for
works created by independent contractors,52 “a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use . . . as a part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work [or one of eight other types of works] . . .,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”53 Thus, if
an underwater archeological expedition hires a freelance
photographer to document the expedition, typically the copyright
would be owned by the photographer, unless the parties agree in a
signed writing that the copyright will be owned by the hiring party.
The copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the
copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based on the
copyrighted work, to publicly distribute copies of the copyrighted
work, and to publicly perform or publicly display the copyrighted
work.54 These rights are subject to numerous exceptions and
limitations,55 including the fair use doctrine. The statute states that
“the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
--------------------

entitled to copyright protection.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
49
17 U.S.C. § 201(a). A “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “joint work”). Courts generally
add two additional elements: that each author must contribute some original expression,
as opposed to ideas or research; and that each must have intended to be joint authors.
See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 500, 506–09 (2d Cir. 1991); Aalmuhammed v.
Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 2000).
50
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
51
17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (definition of “work made for hire”).
52
See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742–43 (“The structure of § 101 indicates a work for hire
can arise through one of two mutually exclusive means, one for employees and one for
independent contractors.”).
53
17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (definition of “work made for hire”).
54
17 U.S.C. § 106.
55
Id. (“Subject to sections 107 through 122 . . .”).
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copyright,” and it provides six illustrative purposes57 and four
factors for a court to consider in deciding whether a given use is a
fair use.58
July 2018

56

III
THREE ISSUES IN COPYRIGHT LAW AS IT APPLIES
TO UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE
A. Exclusive Photographic Rights
In 1985, a joint American-French expedition led by Dr. Robert
Ballard of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and JeanLouis Michel of the French Research Institute for the Exploitation
of the Sea (IFREMER)59 discovered the wreck of the RMS Titanic
in the northern Atlantic Ocean.60 In 1986, Ballard returned to the
Titanic and took some 57,000 photographs; but he decided not to
-------------------56

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Id. (“for purposes such as comment, criticism, news reporting, teaching . . .,
scholarship, or research”). These uses are not automatically fair use; instead all uses
must be judged according to the four factors. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
58
17 U.S.C. § 107. The four factors are “(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Id.
59
In French, Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer. In
subsequent litigation, U.S. courts have translated the name as “Institute of France for the
Research and Exploration of the Sea,” see, e.g., RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d
943, 952 (4th Cir. 1999), but that translation is inaccurate in several respects. First, the
French word is “exploitation” rather than “exploration,” and both words are spelled the
same (and have the same meanings) in English. Second, the prepositions in the French
name are “French Institute of Research for the Exploitation of the Sea,” rather than
“French Institute for Research and Exploitation of the Sea.”
60
Haver, 171 F.3d at 952 (4th Cir. 1999); H.R. Rep. 99–393, at 4 (1986). See
generally DR. ROBERT D. BALLARD, THE DISCOVERY OF THE TITANIC (Warner/Madison
Press 1987). For an overview of the subsequent legal battles concerning the Titanic, see
generally
David
G.
Concannon,
Titanic
Legal
Battles,
at
https://www.davidconcannon.com/titanic-legal-battles (last visited May 1, 2018) (the
online article is a revised version of David G. Concannon, The Battle for the R.M.S.
Titanic, The Philadelphia Lawyer, Summer 1999, Vol. 62, No. 2); and Ricardo Elia,
Titanic in the Courts, Archeology, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January/February 2001).
57
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recover any artifacts from the wreck. Instead, “he worked to
promote an international agreement to protect the Titanic from
commercial salvage.”62 His efforts resulted in the passage of the
R.M.S. Titanic Marine Memorial Act of 1986,63 which was enacted
“to encourage international negotiations to develop an international
agreement and guidelines to protect this unique shipwreck from
potential harm caused by misguided salvage.”64 Although the
negotiations eventually resulted in a proposed Agreement
Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS Titanic,65 to date it has
been ratified only by the United Kingdom.66
Ballard’s French partners felt differently. In 1987, IFREMER
mounted a joint expedition with Titanic Ventures, a Connecticut
limited partnership, to conduct the first salvage operations of the
Titanic, recovering approximately 1,800 artifacts.67 Seven years
later, after a skirmish over exclusive salvage rights between Titanic
Ventures and a competing claimant,68 the successor-in-interest to
-------------------61

Concannon, supra note 60, ¶¶ 6,7.
Id. ¶ 7; see also H.R Rep. No, 99–393, at 6 (1986).
63
Pub. L. No. 99–513, §1, 100 Stat. 2082 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§450rr-450rr-6.).
64
H.R. Rep. No. 99–393, at 5 (1986).
65
The text of the proposed agreement is available at https://www.gc.noaa.gov/
documents/titanic-agreement.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018). The negotiations also
resulted in the promulgation by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of Guidelines for Research, Recovery and Salvage of RMS Titanic, 66 Fed.
Reg. 18905 (Apr. 12, 2001).
66
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of General Counsel,
R.M.S. Titanic — International Agreement, at https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_titanicintl.html (last visited May 1, 2018). Wikipedia incorrectly states that it has been ratified
by both the United Kingdom and the United States. Wikipedia, Wreck of the RMS
Titanic, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wreck_of_the_RMS_Titanic (last visited May
1, 2018).
67
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1999).
68
See Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 805 F. Supp. 375
(E.D. Va. 1992), rev’d, 2 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1993). Marex Titanic was funded in part by
Jack Grimm, a Texas oilman who had previously funded three expeditions to try to find
the Titanic and claimed to have discovered its propeller in 1981. Ballard, supra note 60,
at 45–51. Marex based its salvage claim on two items, a pill bottle and a hull fragment,
which it claimed to have recovered, but which in fact had been surreptitiously taken
during a 1991 filming expedition. 2 F.3d at 545 & n.1; JOHN P. EATON & CHARLES A.
HAAS, TITANIC: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 313 (W.W. Norton 2d ed. 1994). While a vessel
chartered by Marex was at sea, the District Court awarded exclusive salvage rights to
Titanic Ventures and enjoined Marex Titanic from any salvage operations. 805 F. Supp.
at 376–77. Although the decision was reversed on a technicality (because Marex had
62

Copyright Law and UCH 451
Titanic Ventures, RMS Titanic, Inc. (RMST),69 was awarded
exclusive salvage rights to the Titanic as salvor-in-possession.70 To
ensure continued access to IFREMER’s scientific equipment,
RMST agreed with the French government that it would not sell off
any artifacts recovered from the wreck.71
In 1995, movie director James Cameron chartered a Russian
vessel and two Russian submersibles to film the wreck for his
movie Titanic.72 Although RMST initially threatened litigation, it
decided not to seek an injunction, reasoning that Cameron only
intended to photograph the wreck and not to take any artifacts.73
During the filming, however, the Russian subs allegedly inflicted
irreparable damage, leaving debris (including a broken propeller)
behind.74 RMST would not discover the damage until it returned to
the site the following year;75 but the experience may have
contributed to RMST’s determination not to allow any other
filming expeditions in the future.
After fending off a claim that it was not sufficiently diligent or
financially able to continue as salvor-in-possession,76 RMST
learned that John Joslyn, a television producer and shareholder of
July 2018

-------------------filed a motion for voluntary dismissal before the ruling), 2 F.3d at 547–48, Marex did
not renew its claims to the Titanic. EATON & HAAS, supra, at 313.
69
Titanic Ventures owns 43% of the shares of RMS Titanic, Inc. RMS Titanic, Inc.
v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924 F. Supp. 714, 716–17 (E.D. Va. 1996). RMS
Titanic, Inc. purchased the artifacts and salvage rights from Titanic Ventures in May
1993. EATON & HAAS, supra note 68, at 313. This article will refer to RMS Titanic, Inc.,
as RMST, in order to avoid confusion with the name of the vessel itself.
70
924 F. Supp. at 715–16 & n.2.
71
Id. at 718 n.10.
72
JOHN P. EATON & CHARLES A. HAAS, TITANIC: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME 205
(W.W. Norton 1999).
73
Concannon, supra note 60, ¶ 14, citing RMST Periodic Report, September 20,
1996. RMST was required to file periodic reports with the District Court as a condition
of its salvor-in-possession status.
74
EATON & HAAS, supra note 72, at 205.
75
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624, 636
n.11, 637 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver,
171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999).
76
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924 F. Supp. 714, 722–24
(E.D. Va. 1996).
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77
RMST, was planning a trip to film and photograph the wreck.78
RMST sought and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting
Joslyn “and any other person having notice of this Order . . . from
conducting search, survey, salvage operations, or obtaining any
image or photography of the Titanic wreck or wreck site.”79 The
District Court explained:
The Court granted [RMST] possession of the wreck site for
monetary gain in order to compensate it for these [salvage] efforts
and to encourage their continuation. The Court is of the opinion that
photographs can be marketed like any other physical artifact and,
therefore, the rights to images, photographs, videos, and the like
belong to [RMST]. . . .
[Because RMST] is not selling artifacts like traditional salvors, it
must be given the rights to other means of obtaining income. . . .
[A]llowing another “salvor” to take photographs of the wreck and
wreck site is akin to allowing another salvor to physically invade
the wreck and take artifacts themselves.80

The court concluded that “[RMST] has the exclusive right to take
any and all types of photographic images of the Titanic wreck and
wreck site.”81
-------------------77

Joslyn was one of the original partners in Titanic Ventures, RMST’s predecessorin-interest. See Investors Sue Over Titanic Salvage, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1987. His
production company, Westgate Productions, helped fund the 1987 expedition in
exchange for television rights. William F. Buckley, Jr., Down to the Great Ship, N.Y.
Times Magazine, Oct. 17, 1987, at 40, 93. Joslyn was executive producer of the resulting
television special, Return to the Titanic: Live!, in which host Telly Savalas opened a safe
and a satchel recovered from the Titanic by the 1987 expedition. See John Corry, TV
Review: Safe from Titanic is Opened, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1987, at C32; Ken Ringle,
“Titanic . . . Live!”: A Night to Forget, Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1987; John Joslyn,
IMDb, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0430875/ (last visited May 1, 2018).
78
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 1996 AMC 2497, 2498
(E.D. Va. 1996).
79
1996 AMC at 2498.
80
Id. at 2498–99.
81
Id. at 2500. Joslyn got his revenge in 1999, when he participated in “a plan by a
group of insurgent RMS shareholders, including Joslyn, . . . to remove four RMS
directors and two RMS officers, and to install [two others] as officers.” In the Matter of
Joslyn, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11718, ¶ 8 (Oct.
26, 2004). In 2004, the SEC ruled that Joslyn and the others had violated federal
securities law. Id. ¶ III-3. After helping to seize control of RMST, Joslyn later opened
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In 1998, Deep Ocean Expeditions, a British Virgin Islands
corporation, announced that it would mount an expedition in
August 1998 using the Russian vessels, and would take members
of the public to visit the wreck for $32,500 each.82 One of the
tourists was Christopher Haver, a wealthy real estate developer
from Arizona.83 Upon learning of Deep Ocean’s plans, RMST filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit them from coming
within 10 miles of the Titanic, and specifically to prohibit them
from taking any photographs or video.84 Haver filed a lawsuit
against RMST, which was consolidated with the pending action.85
The District Court granted the preliminary injunction, reiterating
its conclusion that allowing other expeditions would interfere with
the salvor’s rights:
July 2018

First, the salvor in possession has a right to salvage the wreck free
from the interference of others. In a case of historical and
archeological salvage, interference may take two forms—
interference with the salvor's active operations and interference
with the wreck itself. If a photographic expedition is on the site at
the same time RMST plans to carry on salvage operations, RMST
may be forced to abort its salvage plans in the interests of safety. . . .
Because photographers must work so close to the wreck, there is a
significant risk of interference with or injury to the wreck itself . . .
The second rationale for excluding third-party photographers
involves allowing RMST to at least recoup its investment in the
salvage operations.86

-------------------two Titanic Museum Attractions in Branson, Missouri and Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. See
The Man Behind the Museum, http://www.titanicpigeonforge.com/the-man-behind-themuseum (last visited May 1, 2018).
82
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624, 628–29
(E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943,
953 (4th Cir. 1999).
83
171 F.3d at 953; see also Wikipedia, Chris Haver, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Chris_Haver (last visited May 1, 2018).
84
9 F. Supp. 2d at 629–30. RMST mailed copies of its motion to Deep Ocean and
the other participants, but it did not file a complaint against them or serve them with
process. Concannon, supra note 60, ¶ 20.
85
9 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
86
Id. at 635–36.
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The District Court also concluded that the balance of hardships
favored RMST:
[I]n balancing the alleged sentimental harm of failing to view and
photograph the wreck “firsthand” against RMST's harm of losing a
salvage season, losing the exclusive rights to license photographs
of the wreck for fees, and having the wreck tampered with, the
Court finds that RMST's harm significantly outweighs any harm to
the photographic expedition. . . . Even comparing RMST's harm
with the quixotic harm of a band of adventure tourists borders on
the irrational.87

Despite the injunction, Deep Ocean Expeditions went ahead
with its expedition in September 1998 (after RMST had completed
its own August expedition).88 Both Haver and Deep Ocean
appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. In March 1999, the Fourth Circuit held that “the injunction
against [Deep Ocean] must be vacated for lack of personal
jurisdiction,”89 because, although Deep Ocean had actual notice of
the motion, it had never appeared in the in rem action and it had
never been properly served.90 Because Haver had filed a lawsuit
and appeared, however, the injunction against him had to be
considered on the merits.91 The Fourth Circuit held that the District
Court had not erred in exercising “constructive in rem jurisdiction”
over the wreck and in awarding exclusive salvage rights to
RMST.92 It also held, however, that “the district court erred in
extending the law of salvage to vest in RMST exclusive rights to
visit, view, and photograph the wreck and wreck site of the Titanic
at its location in international waters.”93 It explained:
-------------------87

Id. at 638.
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 955 (4th Cir. 1999); Concannon, supra
note 60, ¶ 25; Elia, supra note 60, ¶ 11.
89
171 F.3d at 958.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 959.
92
Id. at 966–67 (exclusive salvage rights) & 967–69 (jurisdiction). The Court
cautioned, however, that because the wreck lies in international waters, it is subject to
the “shared sovereignty” of all nations, limiting the district court’s ability to enforce its
orders without obtaining in rem jurisdiction over artifacts actually brought into court, or
in personam jurisdiction over the parties to be enjoined. Id. at 967–69.
93
Id. at 970.
88
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To award, in the name of salvage service, the exclusive right to
photograph a shipwreck, would . . . tend to convert what was
designed as a salvage operation on behalf of the owners into an
operation serving the salvors. . . . Salvors would be less inclined to
save property because they might be able to obtain more
compensation by leaving the property in place and selling
photographic images or charging the public admission to go view
it.
Even if we were to assume that the salvors had full title to the yet
to be recovered shipwreck, . . . it is doubtful that such title to
property lying in international waters would include the right to
exclude others from viewing and photographing it while in its
public site. Exclusive viewing and photographing of property is
usually achieved by exercising exclusive possession and removing
the property to a private or controllable location where it cannot be
viewed or photographed except under conditions controlled by the
owner. But a property right does not normally include the right to
exclude viewing and photographing of the property when it is
located in a public place.94

The Fourth Circuit added, however, that the District Court could
enjoin parties over whom it had jurisdiction from salvaging
artifacts or interfering with RMST’s salvage operations.95 The U.S.
Supreme Court denied RMST’s petition for certiorari.96
This ruling represents a serious obstacle to the UNESCO
Convention’s effort to promote in situ preservation of underwater
cultural heritage in historic shipwrecks. “An historic salvor must
balance the need to profit from salvaging a wreck with the need to
preserve the archeological value of the wreck and its artifacts.”97
Denying exclusive rights to photograph the wreck places a wouldbe salvor in a catch-22: if it brings artifacts to the surface, it may
-------------------94
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 970 (4th Cir. 1999). The court noted
that “even under American copyright law, where an architect has a copyright in the
design of a building, that right does not extend to prevent the viewing and photographing
of the building, if it is located at a public site or is visible from a public place. See 17
U.S.C. § 120(a).” Id. at 970 n.5.
95
Id. at 970–71.
96
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 528 U.S. 825 (1999).
97
Justin S. Stern, Smart Salvage: Extending Traditional Maritime Law to Include
Intellectual Property Rights of Historic Shipwrecks, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2489, 2527
(2000).
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98
violate the principles of the UNESCO Convention; but if it fails
to actively bring artifacts to the surface, it is in danger of losing its
exclusive rights to another who is willing to salvage the artifacts.99
Moreover, any solution to the problem of using exclusive
photographic rights to finance UNESCO-compliant expeditions
will have to lie in international law. Congress could pass a statute
to alter the law of salvage (as it has with the Abandoned Shipwreck
Act of 1988100), but any such statute would apply only to citizens
or permanent residents of the United States, or to shipwrecks
located within the territorial waters of the United States.101
Congress does not have legislative authority to extend the
traditional law of salvage to include the exclusive right to
photograph historic shipwrecks located in international waters.

B. Ownership of Copyright
RMST’s 1986 expedition to the Titanic also triggered a legal
dispute concerning ownership of copyright in the resulting
underwater photography. Alexander Lindsay, a British
photographer, had filmed and directed a documentary, Explorers of
the Titanic, during the 1994 RMST expedition.102 For the next two
years, Lindsay worked with RMST, helping to plan and raise
-------------------98

Note, however, that the UNESCO Convention does not forbid salvage of historic
artifacts, “provided such [recovery and] deposition does not prejudice the scientific or
cultural interest or integrity of the recovered material or result in its irretrievable
dispersal.” Annex, Rule 2(b). Instead, it states that “[u]nderwater cultural heritage shall
not be commercially exploited,” art. 2(7), and that “[r]ecovered underwater cultural
heritage shall be deposited, conserved and managed in a manner that ensures its longterm preservation,” art. 2(6). The Rules similarly provide that “[u]nderwater cultural
heritage shall not be traded, sold, bought or bartered as commercial goods.” Rule 2.
99
RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924 F. Supp. 714, 724 n.19
(E.D. Va. 1996) (“if a salvor solely concerns itself with on-shore activities and shows
no intention to continue salvaging the wreck site, the salvor should lose its exclusive
salvage rights.”); id. at 724 n.20 (“failure to complete a successful expedition during the
forthcoming 1996 weather window may lead the Court to conclude that RMST's
financial situation prevents it from being able to successfully salvage the site.”).
100
See notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
101
The Abandoned Shipwreck Act, for example, applies only to abandoned
shipwrecks “embedded in” or “located on a State’s submerged lands,” defined as lands
lying below navigable waters. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a).
102
Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609,
1610–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The cover of the VHS cassette of the documentary, however,
says: “Directed and Filmed by Alexander Lindsay and Simon Normanton.”
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money for the 1996 expedition, during which he directed the
lighting and underwater photography.103 In December 1997,
Lindsay filed a lawsuit alleging that he had not been paid, and that
RMST was “profiting from the film, video and still photographs
taken by him” during the 1996 expedition.104 Relying in part on the
not-yet-overturned photographic injunction in the main litigation,
the court allowed Lindsay to maintain an in rem salvage action,
saying:
July 2018

The law of salvage advances the interest in the preservation of
historic shipwrecks by providing a legal vehicle through which
individuals who assist in the preservation of shipwrecks and their
contents may be compensated financially. Undoubtably [sic], the
video and other photographic images of the Titanic wreck site taken
by the plaintiff will contribute to the temporal preservation of this
historic ship.105

The court reasoned that failing to allow an in rem action might
cause “a significant reduction in the video and photographic
documentation of wreck sites . . ., given the fear that a monetary
claim for services performed could not be satisfied [without] a
legally enforceable salvage award against the ship.”106
RMST filed a counterclaim “arising from the plaintiff’s use of
certain video footage taken from the wreck during the 1996
expedition.”107 Lindsay then filed an amended complaint alleging
copyright infringement against RMST and joining the Discovery
Channel as a defendant.108 In his amended complaint, Lindsay
-------------------103

Id. at 1611.
Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 1999 AMC 69, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). The parties stipulated that, pending the outcome of the action, the video
would not be sold or licensed, and the copyright would not be assigned, without court
approval. Id.
105
Id. at 73.
106
Id. The court also denied RMST’s motion to transfer the action to the Eastern
District of Virginia, in part because “the film, video and still photographs that are in
dispute . . . are located within the Southern District of New York.” Id. at 74–75.
107
Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609,
1611 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
108
Id. Lindsay also sued Suarez Corporation, Inc., alleging that it “‘used plaintiff’s
name and likeness’ to promote a 1996 cruise expedition to observe the salvage
operations” and infringed “by unlawfully purchasing and/or otherwise obtaining copies
of the Subject Work.” Id. at 1612. The Court granted Suarez’s motion to dismiss, ruling
104
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alleged that he 1) “created various storyboards for the film, a series
of drawings . . . identifying specific camera angles and shooting
sequences;” 2) “for approximately 3–4 weeks directed, produced,
and acted as the cinematographer of the Subject Work, underwater
video taping of the Titanic wreck site;” and 3) “directed the filming
of the wreck site from on board the salvage vessel ‘Ocean Voyager’
after leading daily planning sessions with the crew of the Nautile,
the submarine used to transport the film equipment and
photographers to the underwater wreck site.”109
RMST filed a motion to dismiss the copyright infringement
action on two grounds: first, that Lindsay was not the “author” of
the footage, since he “did not himself actually photograph the
wreckage;”110 and second, that RMST, as employer of
photographer Christian Petron, was at least a joint author of the
footage.111 The court denied the motion.
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an “author” as the person
“who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates
an idea into fixed, tangible expression.”112 The District Court
acknowledged that “[i]n the context of film footage and
photography, it makes intuitive sense that the ‘author’ of a work is
the individual or individuals who took the pictures, i.e., the
photographer.”113 However,
[W]here a plaintiff alleges that he exercised such a high degree of
control over a film operation—including the type and amount of
lighting used, the specific camera angles to be employed, and other
detail-intensive artistic elements of a film—such that the final
product duplicates his conceptions and visions of what the film

--------------------

that the “vague and conclusory allegations” against Suarez were insufficient to state a
claim. Id.
109
Id. at 1611, citing Amended Complaint ¶¶ 38, 45–47. Lindsay also alleged that
he “screened the footage at the end of each day to confirm that he had obtained the
images he wanted.” Id. at 1613, citing Am. Comp. ¶ 48.
110
Id. at 1612.
111
Id. at 1614. RMST alleged that it owned Petron’s contributions to the film under
a work-made-for-hire agreement. Id.; see also notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
112
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
113
Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609,
1612 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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should look like, the plaintiff may be said to be an “author” within
the meaning of the Copyright Act.114

Assuming the facts as pleaded were true, “Lindsay’s alleged
storyboards and the specific direction he provided to the film crew
regarding the use of the lightowers [sic] and the angles from which
to shoot the wreck all indicate that the final footage would indeed
be the product of Lindsay’s ‘original intellectual conceptions.’”115
Thus, “[t]he fact that Lindsay did not literally perform the filming,
i.e. by diving to the wreck and operating the cameras, will not
defeat his claims of having ‘authored’ the illuminated footage.”116
As for joint authorship, the court noted that, in addition to
showing that the work was “prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole,”117 courts have also
required evidence that “each of the putative co-authors (1) fully
intended to be co-authors, and (2) made independently
copyrightable contributions to the work.”118 Assuming the facts as
pleaded were true, the court found that both of these additional
elements were lacking in this case:
[W]here one contributor retains a so-called “veto” authority over
what is included in a work, such control is a strong indicator that he
or she does not intend to be co-authors with the other contributor.
According to the pleadings, the plaintiff exercised virtually total
control over the content of the film as “the director, producer and
cinematographer” of the production. Additionally, he briefed the
photographers with regards to, inter alia, the specific camera angles
they were to employ, and Lindsay screened the film each day to
make sure the proper footage was obtained. Based on these
allegations, and implicit in the notion that the film crew was simply
“following directions,” Lindsay retained what appeared to be
exclusive authority over what was included in the footage.119

-------------------114

Id. at 1613.
Id.
116
Id.
117
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “joint work”).
118
Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609,
1614 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
119
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
115
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Whether Lindsay’s factual allegations were true was never
adjudicated. After the ruling on the motion to dismiss, the parties
quickly settled the case for an undisclosed amount.120
Lindsay remains one of a handful of cases in U.S. copyright law
in which the author is deemed to be someone with a creative vision
who instructs others how to translate that vision into fixed
expression, and the others simply carry out those instructions
without any intellectual modification.121 This is consistent with the
Copyright Act, which refers to a work “fixed by or under the
authority of the author.”122 The italicized language indicates that
the “author” does not have to be the person who actually operates
the camera or other recording device, so long as the operator is
merely following instructions and does not make any creative
choices in doing so.123 But this inquiry is obviously very factspecific: if the person carrying out the instructions adds
copyrightable expression in doing so, he or she becomes at least a
joint author;124 and if the person giving instructions simply conveys
general ideas about what the work should be, leaving the expressive
details to the second person, then the second person becomes the
sole author.125
In the context of underwater photography, there are numerous
possibilities. First, the “author” could be the person who actually
operates the camera, if he or she makes creative choices in doing
so. Second, the “author” could be the person who conceives of
creative expression and gives others detailed instructions on how
to translate that conception into fixed form, as was alleged in
Lindsay. Or the director and the camera operator could be joint
-------------------120

Email of Apr. 30, 2018, from Alexander Lindsay to the author (on file with the
author).
121
See Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132,
134–35 (3d Cir. 1991); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991); see
also 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:22 (West 2018 ed.), and cases cited
therein, at nn. 27–30.
122
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “fixed”) (emphasis added).
123
Andrien, 927 F.2d at 134–35.
124
Id. at 136; see also Fleming v. Miles, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1157 (D. Or. 2001).
125
See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A person
who merely describes to an author what the commissioned work should do or look like
is not a joint author . . . To be an author, one must supply more than mere direction or
ideas”); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
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authors. And, of course, if either or both of the authorial
claimants are employees of the expedition’s organizer, or if either
or both are independent contractors that have signed work-madefor hire agreements, then the employer or commissioning party will
be deemed to be the “author” under the work-for-hire doctrine,127
and the employer or commissioning party will own that person’s
share of the resulting copyright.128
Contemporary technology gives the problem of determining
authorship an additional wrinkle. Today, underwater photography
is often carried out through the use of remote-operated vehicles, or
drones. Thus, both the director and the operator may be on the
surface, instructing the drone where to go and when and how to
take pictures. Moreover, one can expect that in the future some
drones will be equipped with artificial intelligence software, which
“learns” how to photograph and document the underwater
environment on its own. Thus, it is entirely possible that future
underwater photography may be accomplished without any human
input (other than bringing the drone to the wreck site). If that is the
case, there is no human “author,” and there will be no copyright in
the resulting footage.129 Without a copyright, financing the
expedition by selling the rights to the resulting underwater
photography becomes more problematic; although it is possible
that a combination of contract law, the work-for-hire doctrine, and
physical access to the underwater footage may be a sufficient basis
for licensing, which may in turn cause a court to gloss over the
July 2018
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Note however that 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 260–61 & n.7
(2d Cir. 2015), appears to foreclose the possibility of inadvertent joint authorship,
forcing the court to choose between two parties who each contributed significant creative
expression.
127
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “work made for hire”).
128
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
129
U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of Copyright Office Practices § 313.2 (3d
ed. 2014) (“To qualify as a work of “authorship” a work must be created by a human
being . . . . [T]he Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input
or intervention from a human author.”) For a discussion of the problem of artificial
intelligence and authorship, see Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the
Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 5.
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issues of authorship in the event that judicial enforcement is
needed.

C. State Regulation
A final issue arises out of a different historical shipwreck, the
Queen Anne’s Revenge. It was the flagship of “Edward Teach,
more famously known as Blackbeard, [who] notoriously pirated
vessels across the Caribbean and eastern coast of Britain's North
American colonies”130 for several years in the early 18th Century.131
“In 1717 Teach captured a French merchant vessel [La Concorde],
renamed her Queen Anne's Revenge, and equipped her with 40
guns.”132 In June 1718, “the Queen Anne's Revenge [ran] aground
on a sandbar near Beaufort, North Carolina.”133 The wreck was lost
for almost three centuries when it was rediscovered on November
21, 1996.134 Because the wreck lies within three miles of the coast,
under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, the wreck is owned
by the State of North Carolina.135
The wreck was discovered by a marine salvage company,
Intersal, Inc., under a permit issued by the State’s Department of
Natural and Cultural Resources (DNCR).136 Although the permit
allowed Intersal to claim 75% of any treasure recovered from the
ship,137 Intersal later agreed to assign all property rights in the ship
and its contents in exchange for exclusive media rights to the
salvage project.138 By agreement dated Sept. 1, 1998, DNCR agreed
that “Intersal shall have the exclusive right to make and market all
-------------------130

Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 530 & n.2 (E.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 895
F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018).
131
See generally ANGUS KONSTAM, BLACKBEARD: AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS
PIRATE (J. Wiley & Sons 2006).
132
Allen, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 530 n.2.
133
Id. Historians suspect that Blackbeard deliberately ran the vessel aground, so that
he could disperse much of the crew, which had become too large with which to share the
spoils of piracy. See KONSTAM, supra note 131, at 150–51, 181–86.
134
Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 2017 WL 4574069, at ¶ 7 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12,
2017). See also MARK U. WILDE-RAMSING & LINDA F. CARNES-MCNAUGHTON,
BLACKBEARD’S SUNKEN PRIZE: THE 300-YEAR VOYAGE OF QUEEN ANNE’S REVENGE
(Univ. N. Carolina Press 2018).
135
See notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
136
Intersal, 2017 WL 4574069, at ¶¶ 6, 7.
137
Id. ¶ 7.
138
Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 11.
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commercial narrative (written, film, CD Rom, and/or video)
accounts of project related activities undertaken by the Parties” for
a period of 15 years.139 Intersal designated Nautilus Productions,
LLC, to document the project.140
In 2013, both Intersal and Nautilus accused DNCR of violating
the 1998 Agreement.141 The parties and Nautilus entered into a
Settlement Agreement142 that gave Intersal the “exclusive right to
produce a documentary film about the QAR project for licensing
and sale”143 and also restricted DNCR’s ability to post digital media
to non-commercial websites.144 The Settlement Agreement also
provided that the parties would collaborate on other commercial
ventures, including “books and e-books, mini- and full-length
documentaries, and video games.”145 Finally, DNCR paid $15,000
to Nautilus to settle its past claims of copyright infringement.146
In March 2015, Intersal accused DNCR of breaching the 2013
Settlement Agreement.147 In July 2015, Intersal filed an action for
breach of contract in Superior Court in North Carolina.148 In
July 2018
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Id. ¶ 8 (quoting ¶ 16 of the 1998 Agreement), ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 16. See also Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 530 (E.D.N.C. 2017)
(“Frederick Allen and his production company Nautilus Productions, have been the
substantially exclusive underwater photographers of the shipwreck Queen Anne's
Revenge . . . Allen's work documenting the shipwreck through video and still images
began in 1998.”), rev’d, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018).
141
Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 2017 WL 4574069, at ¶¶ 13, 14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct.
12, 2017).
142
Id. ¶ 17. The Settlement Agreement expressly supersedes the 1998 Agreement.
Id. ¶ 18.
143
Id. ¶ 19. This section of the agreement can be terminated on six months’ notice,
beginning four years after the DNCR notifies Intersal that the project is complete. 2013
Settlement Agreement, at ¶14, available at nautilusproductions.com/nautilus/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/NCDOJ-Copyright-Opinion.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018).
The 2013 Settlement Agreement includes the 1998 Agreement as an Attachment.
144
Specifically, DNCR agreed “to display non-commercial digital media only on
[DNCR's] website,” and it further agreed that any non-commercial digital media would
bear a time code stamp and digital watermark, and would be accompanied by a link to
the Intersal and Nautilus websites. 2013 Settlement Agreement, at ¶ 16(b). This section
will expire on October 15, 2018. Id. ¶ 16(c).
145
2013 Settlement Agreement, at ¶ 15.
146
2013 Settlement Agreement, at ¶ 22; Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 531
(E.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018).
147
Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 2017 WL 4574069, at ¶ 22 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12,
2017).
148
Id. ¶ 29.
140
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October 2015, the Superior Court dismissed the action based on
Intersal’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.149
Also in 2015, Nautilus accused DNCR of breaching the 2013
Settlement Agreement by posting and publishing some of its
footage and photographs without its consent.150 In response, DNCR
allegedly lobbied for and obtained passage of a 2015 amendment
to the North Carolina Public Records Act, “in an effort to convert
[Nautilus’s] copyright assets to State property without payment to
[Nautilus].”151 As further amended in 2016, that amendment reads:
All photographs, video recordings, or other documentary
materials of a derelict vessel or shipwreck or its contents, relics,
artifacts, or historic materials in the custody of any agency of North
Carolina government or its subdivisions shall be a public record
pursuant to Chapter 132 of the General Statutes.152
Chapter 132 provides that, with certain exceptions, the State will
provide copies of public records for a minimal fee,153 and it permits
third parties to bring an action against the State for failure to
provide such copies.154
Nautilus and its owner, Frederick Allen, filed a lawsuit against
DNCR, various state officials, and The Friends of Queen Anne’s
Revenge (a non-profit group) for copyright infringement, and for a
declaratory judgment that the statutory amendment was invalid and
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Id. ¶¶ 46, 49–51. The breach of contract claim and a claim for declaratory relief
were dismissed without prejudice; all other claims were dismissed with prejudice. Id. ¶¶
81–89.
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Allen, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 531.
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Id.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–25(b). Before the 2016 amendment, the 2015 amendment
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requirement to alter any such photograph, video recordings, or other documentary
material, and any such provision in any agreement, permit, or license shall be void and
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.” Allen, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 531. It appears this
clause was aimed at the digital watermark restriction in the 2013 Settlement Agreement.
153
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132–1(b) (“it is the policy of this State that the people may
obtain copies of their public records and public information free or at minimal cost unless
otherwise specifically provided by law.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132–6(a) (inspection,
examination, and copying of public records); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132–6(a1) (section
satisfied if agency “maintains public records online in a format that allows a person to
view and print or save the public records to obtain a copy”).
154
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132–9.
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unenforceable, because it was preempted by the Copyright Act
and because it constituted an unconstitutional taking of private
property without due process of law or just compensation, in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.156 The state agencies and state officials filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing primarily that the claims were barred by
sovereign immunity, legislative immunity, and qualified
immunity.157
The District Court rejected the claims of immunity and allowed
the causes of action for copyright infringement, and for a
declaratory judgment of invalidity, to stand.158 On appeal, however,
the Fourth Circuit reversed, ordering dismissal of the claims against
the state and state officials in their official capacities without
prejudice (based on state sovereign immunity), and ordering
dismissal of the claims against state officials in their individual
capacities with prejudice (based on qualified immunity and
legislative immunity).159
With regard to state sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs first
argued that the State had waived its sovereign immunity in the 2013
Settlement Agreement.160 The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument,
based on Supreme Court case law that “a State must expressly
consent to suit in federal court to waive its immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.”161
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Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 531 (E.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 337
(4th Cir. 2018). The plaintiffs also pled a deprivation of property under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, unfair and deceptive trade practices under state law, and civil conspiracy. Id. The
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property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”). The Fourteenth Amendment makes the limitations of the
Fifth Amendment applicable to the states.
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lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and that abstention was appropriate. Id. The District
Court rejected both of the latter arguments. Id. at 541–42 (standing), id. at 542–43
(abstention).
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Allen, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 545–46 (“Plaintiffs' first and second claims remain
against all defendants”).
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Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018), at 343, 358.
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Id. at 346.
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Id. at 347 (emphasis in original), citing, inter alia, College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999).
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On the merits of the sovereign immunity defense, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of
1990162 expressly makes states and state entities liable for copyright
infringement.163 Thus, the only question is whether the CRCA was
a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Constitution.164 In
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,165 the Supreme Court had held (5–4) that
similar legislation, the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act,166 was an invalid attempt to abrogate the state
sovereign immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment.167 In that
case, the Court had reiterated that “Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the
Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce
Clause or the Patent Clause.”168 The Court had held further that to
validly exercise its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,169 Congress “must identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”170
Finally, although it affirmed that patents are “property” for
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Pub. L. No. 101–553, 104 Stat. 2749 (codified in various sections of Title 17).
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are thus not “Citizens of another State,” the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity for state entities, in both federal
court and state court, even in suits brought by citizens of that state. Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1890); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996)).
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See U.S. Const., amend XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment,171 the Court had held that
Congress “barely considered the availability of state remedies for
patent infringement”172 and did not “respond to a history of
widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights . . .
in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.”173
Since Florida Prepaid, every other lower court to consider the
question has concluded that the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act is likewise an invalid exercise of Congress’ power to waive the
sovereign immunity of the States pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment174 (notwithstanding Justice Stevens’
suggestion in his dissent that the CRCA might be distinguished175).
But the District Court in the Allen case held that the CRCA was a
valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, because “Congress was clearly responding to a
pattern of current and anticipated abuse by the states of the
copyrights held by their citizens.”176 Not content with that holding,
the court then launched into a five-page tirade dissenting from the
Supreme Court’s entire Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.177 Not
-------------------171
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Id. at 642.
Id. at 643.
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Id. at 645. See also Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State
Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement
Claims Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1435, 1514
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Georgia, 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Texas Comm’n on the Arts, 199
F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000);
Issaenko v. Univ. of Minnesota, 57 F. Supp. 3d 985 (D. Minn. 2014); Coyle v. Univ. of
Kentucky, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (E.D. Ky. 2014).
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See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 658 n.9 (1999) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) (“The legislative history of th[e Copyright Remedy Clarification] Act
includes many examples of copyright infringements by States—especially state
universities. . . . Perhaps most importantly, the House requested that the Register of
Copyrights prepare a study . . . [of] state government use of copyrighted works. . . . [See]
Register of Copyrights, R. Oman, Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh
Amendment (June 1988) . . . . This report contains comments from industry groups,
statistics, and legal analysis relating to copyright violations, actual and potential, by
States.”).
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Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 535 (E.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 337,
357 (4th Cir. 2018).
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surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed, because Congress had not
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the CRCA,178 and
because “the record before Congress contained at most a dozen
incidents of copyright infringement by States that could be said to
have violated the Fourteenth Amendment,”179 so that the CRCA
was not “tailor[ed] . . . to remedying or preventing [unconstitutional] conduct.”180
There is one recognized exception to state sovereign immunity:
where a violation of federal law is ongoing, a plaintiff may obtain
an injunction under Ex Parte Young.181 The Fourth Circuit rejected
this exception, however, because the six specific instances of
alleged copyright infringement had ceased, and it was mere
speculation that the state would resume infringing.182 It also
rejected the claim that “enforcement” of the state statute was
ongoing, because none of the state officials sued would or could
have a sufficient role in enforcing the statute.183
The Fourth Circuit also reinstated the individual defendants’
claims of qualified immunity. The 2013 Settlement Agreement
permitted certain uses of the materials at issue, and it expressly
reserved the State’s rights under state and federal public records
laws.184 Moreover, even before the enactment of the 2015
Amendment, state law had provided that “all . . . photographs [and]
films . . . made or received pursuant to law . . . in connection with
the transaction of public business by any agency of North Carolina”
are “public records.”185 Thus, it was not “clearly established”
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Allen, 895 F.3d at 349–350.
Id. at 352–353.
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Id. at 353.
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209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A.
Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to Fix
Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1037, 1095–96 (2001). Note,
however, that state sovereign immunity may “increase the cost of obtaining such
[injunctive] relief, as well as the risk of inconsistent verdicts, since an owner may need
to bring two suits—one in federal court for an injunction and one in a state forum for
compensation—where previously only one infringement suit in federal court had been
needed to obtain both remedies.” Id. at 1096.
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Allen, 895 F.3d at 354–355.
183
Id. at 355.
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Id. at 357.
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Id., quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1. In addition, although not relied on by the
Fourth Circuit, a reasonable state official might have believed that the uses at issue were
fair uses under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“the fair use of a copyrighted
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beyond debate that the state officials’ conduct was infringing.186
The Fourth Circuit also held that the individual defendants were
entitled to legislative immunity, because “the only actual conduct
alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy—that the officers ‘wrote,
caused to be introduced, lobbied for passage of, and obtained
passage’ of [the 2015 Amendment]—is quintessentially legislative
in nature.”187
Because the Fourth Circuit ordered the case dismissed on
immunity grounds, it did not review the District Court’s holding on
the merits that the amendment to the North Carolina statute was
preempted by the federal Copyright Act.188 Nonetheless, because
the case may be refiled in state court,189 it is worth examining the
District Court’s reasoning on the issue.
Under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act,190 a state cause of
action is preempted if two elements are met: “(1) the work must be
within the scope of the subject matter of copyright . . . and (2) the
rights granted under state law must be equivalent to any exclusive
July 2018

-------------------work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”); see also Berman et al., supra note 181,
at 1127 (“Given the up-for-grabs state of fair use law, . . . it is hard to imagine a plaintiff
successfully proving that a governmental official with a plausible fair use claim violated
clearly established law.”).
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sovereign immunity to federal statutory claims based on Congress’ Article 1 powers in
state court as well. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Thus, unless the state has
waived its sovereign immunity, Allen and Nautilus are limited to pleading a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. North Carolina has waived its sovereign immunity for breach of
contract actions, Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 421 (N.C. 1976), for certain kinds of
torts (with exclusive jurisdiction in the North Carolina Industrial Commission), N.C.
Gen. Stat. 143–291, and for claims for violations of the North Carolina Constitution,
Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290, 292 (N.C. 1992). Second, even
valid claims may be subject to certain procedural requirements, such as exhaustion of
administrative remedies. For example, any facial challenge to the validity of a state
statute must be filed in Superior Court in Wake County, and heard by a panel of three
judges. N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-267.1(a1). Third, it is unclear to what extent the defense of res
judicata might be raised to bar claims that could have been filed with the original breach
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rights within the scope of federal copyright.” The District Court
held that both elements were present: “North Carolina’s statute . . .
purports to regulate the right to use and copy ‘photographs, video
recordings, or other documentary materials,’ which is subject
matter within the scope of the Copyright Act;”192 and the Copyright
Act gives Nautilus the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute,
publicly perform and publicly display those materials,193 “but the
state statute in question purports to transfer those exact same rights
to the public domain.”194
The District Court’s analysis of the preemption issue seems off
the mark. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act expressly preempts
claims that are “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.”195 That
means that state laws that attempt to prevent or remedy
reproduction, distribution, public performance and public display
of copyrighted material are preempted.196 But the North Carolina
statute doesn’t attempt to prevent or remedy any of those things;
instead, it provides a defense to copyright infringement, by
authorizing State officials to copy those materials.197 That means
the North Carolina statute isn’t “equivalent” to any of the exclusive
rights, so it doesn’t fall under express statutory preemption. At best,
it might fall under a residual implied conflict preemption
analysis,198 because it arguably “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.”199 At least three lower courts have held that state
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express preemption. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 659–60 (5th Cir. 2000);
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 381–83 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 974, 981–82 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d
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public records statutes permitting or requiring disclosure or
copying of materials protected by federal copyright law are
partially preempted due to conflict preemption.200 The District
Court is wrong, however, when it asserts that the North Carolina
statute places the material in the public domain. Nautilus remains
free to enforce its copyrights against any third parties that obtain
those materials from the State; and to the extent the statute allows
State officials to infringe, those state officials are already shielded
by state sovereign immunity. Thus, it seems unlikely that the statute
interferes substantially with the valid purposes and objectives of
Congress.
The North Carolina statute would seem to present a
straightforward claim for an unconstitutional taking of private
property without due process of law and without just
compensation.201 Yet not all State infringements of intellectual
property rise to the level of a taking;202 and even when they do, the
Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence makes
vindicating a takings claim unnecessarily complicated.203 A takings
July 2018
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claim cannot be heard in federal court unless the State fails to
provide an adequate remedy;204 but the federal government lacks
the power to compel the State to provide an adequate remedy for
copyright infringement in state courts.205 On the other hand, there
are cases suggesting that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
might, of their own force, require a State to provide at least some
type of adequate post-deprivation remedy for a taking,206 and at
least two state courts have held they have jurisdiction to hear claims
against the State for takings of federal intellectual property.207
It seems that the best procedure for Allen and Nautilus would
have been to file an inverse condemnation claim in state court for
just compensation.208 The remedies in such an action will be limited
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Hutto v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 552 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e conclude
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Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“the powers delegated to Congress
under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts.”).
206
See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108 (1994) (“In a long line of cases, this
Court has established that due process requires a ‘clear and certain’ remedy for taxes
collected in violation of federal law.”); id. at 109 (“a denial by a state court of a recovery
of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by
compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (quoting Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930)). See also Berman et al., supra note 181, at 1091
(“due process for a state's deprivation of property would seem to require the state at least
to provide property owners with a postdeprivation action for compensation.”).
207
See Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514, 515 (Ohio App. 1992) (“if the
state of Ohio cannot take a party's patent right without just compensation, then a cause
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States in federal court. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 n.9 (1999).
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Bohannan & Cotter, supra note 173, at 1512; Berman et al., supra note 181, at
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Rev. 1161, 1163 & n.5 (2000).
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to the fair market value of the property taken;209 however, the
remedies against the federal government are likewise so limited.210
In this case, the North Carolina statute appears to authorize the
alleged infringement at issue, and any claim for damages based on
the Copyright Act is barred by sovereign immunity, making a
takings claim the only viable alternative.211
July 2018

IV
CONCLUSION
Synthesizing these cases, one can see that underwater cultural
heritage is subject to three different regimes, depending on where
the artifacts are located. First, shipwrecks and other artifacts
located within three miles of the coast are subject to the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act of 1987 and are owned by the States.212 Because the
Act preempts the law of salvage within these waters, the States can
effectively use their property rights to negotiate for exclusive
photographic rights, as the State of North Carolina did in the Allen
case.213 Moreover, because State officials enjoy sovereign
immunity, a copyright owner’s only remedy in the event of state
infringement may be an inverse condemnation claim in state
court.214 This limitation may discourage parties such as Nautilus
from being willing to undertake underwater photography in the
future, without some greater assurances of compensation (such as
an express waiver of sovereign immunity).
Second, shipwrecks and other artifacts located outside of the
three-mile zone, but within 12 miles of the coast, are within the
territorial waters of the United States.215 Traditional admiralty law,
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as interpreted in RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, currently does not
provide an exclusive right to photograph shipwrecks in such
areas.217 Congress could choose to alter admiralty law in this zone
if it wished, but except for sunken military craft,218 it has not done
so.
Third, shipwrecks and other artifacts located in international
waters are subject to the shared jurisdiction of all countries.219 Any
court presented with a claim can declare what general principles of
international admiralty law provide; but the court’s ability to
enforce its orders depends on its ability to exercise jurisdiction over
the parties or over property actually reduced to possession.220 Under
the Haver decision, traditional admiralty law currently does not
provide an exclusive right to photograph such areas;221 and as the
futile international negotiations following the R.M.S. Titanic
Marine Memorial Act of 1986 demonstrate,222 Congress is without
power to unilaterally change this decision without an international
agreement with other countries.
In all three cases, ownership of the resulting photographs and
video will have to be determined by copyright law. The Lindsay
case suggests what the result will be under U.S. copyright law.223 If
choice-of-law is disputed, however, a court would have to
determine which country’s law applies to a claim of photography
that occurs in international waters. Although choice-of-law
principles are beyond the scope of this article, one would expect
the law of the country with the most significant relationship to the
property and to the parties would prevail.224
As a practical matter, it is likely that the issues raised by this
article will rarely be litigated. The Titanic is a shipwreck of unique
historical importance, so the value of the photographic rights was
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far above what typically would be the case; and few states are likely
to attempt to expropriate copyrights in the manner that North
Carolina did in Allen. But because the UNESCO Convention on the
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage tries to encourage
preservation of underwater cultural heritage in situ, in its original
location on the ocean floor,225 one can expect that at least some
additional disputes concerning the application of copyright law to
underwater cultural heritage will arise in the future. If that occurs,
the author hopes this article will provide some guidance in
resolving those disputes.
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